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We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about
the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic
condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the
true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These
mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get
common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common
knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth
in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an
opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While
the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
In order for smart contracts to condition their execu-
tion on the state of the world, they need access to infor-
mation about the world. While smart contracts can ver-
ify a priori claims with mathematical or cryptographic
certainty, they cannot independently verify a posteriori
claims about the world with the same assurances. As
a matter of epistemological necessity, smart contracts
which condition their behavior on a posteriori knowledge
must rely on trusted oracles to provide that knowledge.
As a result, we can trust these smart contracts only if we
can trust their oracles.
With no possibility of mathematical or cryptographic
verification of a posteriori claims about the world, we
instead look to economic incentives when considering
whether to trust an oracle. We require that the cost (to
the oracle operators) of lying be greater than the ben-
efit. More specifically, we require that truth-telling be
incentive compatible. We also want the operation of the
oracle to have a non-negative expected return for the op-
erators. That is, we require that the operation of the
oracle be individually rational. Finally, we want the ora-
cle to be decentralized in order to avoid both censorship
and a single point of failure.
A common approach to designing such an oracle is
to create a coordination game in which individual hu-
man players are presented with an oracle query and are
asked to report the correct outcome by staking some to-
kens [1, 2]. The oracle outputs whichever outcome re-
ceived the most stake as the “winning outcome”, and
then players are rewarded if and only if they staked in
agreement with the winning outcome. The hope in these
“Schelling scheme” approaches is that the truth will act
as the Schelling point of a coordination game, which
would result in the oracle returning the true outcome to
the oracle query. Although these approaches are appeal-
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ing because they are easy to implement and have a high
degree of social scalability, they have serious drawbacks
that make their real-world success unlikely.
First, Schelling points themselves are an informal so-
lution concept used in the context of coordination games
in which pre-play communication is incomplete or im-
possible, and in bargaining games in which players can-
not make binding agreements [3]. However, in the open
blockchain setting, players can freely engage in pre-play
communication (via Reddit, Twitter, email, etc) and
make binding agreements (for example, via smart con-
tracts). So the Schelling point solution concept is not
one that is known to be applicable in the types of strate-
gic settings in which blockchain oracles operate.
Second, the coordination game approach to oracle
design can be incentive compatible only in the non-
cooperative model. As soon as players are able to make
binding agreements, they can perform bribing attacks
and form coalitions that are large enough to make the
oracle lie without members of the coalition receiving any
penalty [4]. If players can form coalitions, we cannot
rely on truth-telling being incentive compatible for mech-
anisms following the coordination game paradigm. The
root of the problem is that players are rewarded for agree-
ing with the majority whether or not the majority tells
the truth.
For these reasons we think it is unlikely that the
coordination-game approach to decentralized oracle de-
sign will work in practice. We desire an oracle that is
incentive compatible in the cooperative model – where
players can engage in pre-play communication and make
binding agreements.
In addition to being incentive compatible in isolation,
one must also consider the trustworthiness of oracles
in the presence of “extraneous incentives”: truth-telling
must be incentive compatible when the output of the
oracle is consumed to control the irreversible payout of
large amounts of cryptocurrency. For example, every bet
placed on a decentralized betting platform increases the
gross incentive to make the platform’s oracle lie. Many
existing blockchain oracle designs do not explicitly con-
sider the incentives introduced by the consumption of
the oracle’s output when analyzing the incentive com-
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2patibility of their mechanisms. (With the exception of
Augur’s oracle design [5], we are unaware of any proposed
blockchain oracles, centralized or decentralized, that ex-
plicitly quantify and address this risk.) However, ex-
plicit consideration of such extraneous incentives is cru-
cial when considering the security of oracles to be de-
ployed for real-world use. For a given oracle design, we
can quantify this risk and state precisely how much ex-
traneous incentive the design can handle before losing
incentive compatibility.
B. Our Approach
In this paper, we describe a new approach to ora-
cle design that does not follow the coordination-game
paradigm. For the mechanisms in this paper, truth-
telling is – under certain reasonable economic conditions
– incentive compatible in both the non-cooperative and
cooperative game-theoretic models. A large coalition
may form that makes the oracle lie, but members of such
a coalition are severely penalized. Indeed, they are penal-
ized more than they might gain from causing the oracle
to lie. This stands in contrast to mechanisms based on
coordination games, which reward such large coalitions
for lying.
At a high level, we begin with a separation of con-
cerns. We create a distinction between those who want to
get common knowledge a posteriori information on-chain
and those who possess such common knowledge. We refer
to the former as queriers and the latter as reporters. For
example, a trustless, decentralized platform for betting
on the outcomes of elections would be a querier because
it wants to get the true outcomes of elections on-chain
in order to settle bets. A collection of humans that tells
the platform which candidates have won would be a set
of reporters.
We then create mechanisms based upon repeated
games – played by queriers and reporters – wherein each
stage game corresponds to an oracle query and the out-
come of each stage game determines how the oracle re-
sponds to the query. We show that under certain eco-
nomic conditions (which explicitly include any extrane-
ous incentives introduced by any consumption of the or-
acle’s output) there exists equilibrium behavior in these
stage games that results in the oracle returning the true
outcome of real world events. These first incentive com-
patibility proofs take place in the non-cooperative model
and assume that the set of queriers and the set of re-
porters is disjoint.
We present three such mechanisms. Each mechanism
is more complex than the last, but also has better scala-
bility properties. We more closely examine the conditions
under which our results hold and discuss the weaknesses
of our approach. We also consider the cooperative game-
theoretic model, where the queriers and reporters can
form coalitions (or may even be the same people). We
show that, with some additional conditions, our results
hold in the cooperative model as well.
II. DEFINITIONS
Definition (Outcome space). For all events E, an out-
come space of E, denoted ΩE, is a finite set of possible
outcomes of E. We require that every outcome space con-
tain the special element Invalid, and that no outcome
space contain the special element Abstain. When the
event E is clear from context, we may drop the subscript
and denote the outcome space Ω.
Definition (Oracles and queries). An oracle is any algo-
rithm that accepts as input an event E, a corresponding
outcome space Ω, (and, optionally, some additional ar-
guments) and outputs some ω ∈ Ω. A call to the oracle
is referred to as a query.
Definition (Common knowledge). A proposition P is
said to be common knowledge among a group of agents
G if all agents in G know P , they all know that they all
know P , they all know that they all know that they all
know P , and so on, ad infinitum [6].
The group of agents G is the collection of all users who
interact with the oracle. Informally, one may consider a
proposition to be common knowledge if it can be quickly
verified by any user with access to the World Wide Web.
Definition (True outcome). For every oracle query with
arguments E and Ω, we define a unique outcome in Ω to
be the true outcome for the query. We denote such an
outcome True, and it is defined as follows. If there exists
a unique outcome ω ∈ Ω \ {Invalid} such that – at the
time of the oracle query – it is common knowledge that
the outcome of event E is ω, then ω is the true outcome
for the query. Otherwise, Invalid is the true outcome
for the query.
Definition (False outcome). For every oracle query, ev-
ery outcome in Ω that is not True is a false outcome.
It is important to note that simply corresponding to
objective reality is not a sufficient condition for an out-
come to be the True outcome for a query. The fact that
the outcome corresponds to objective reality must also
be common knowledge at the time of the query.
Definition (Valid query). A query whose True outcome
is not Invalid is referred to a valid query.
Using this terminology, our objective for this paper is
to construct a decentralized, incentive compatible, indi-
vidually rational mechanism that decides the True out-
come of valid queries.
Definition (Ω-partition). If T is a finite set of tokens,
E is an event, and Ω is an outcome space of E, then an
Ω-partition of T is an indexed family of |Ω| + 1 mutu-
ally disjoint subsets of T (referred to as cells) indexed
3by Ω ∪ {Abstain} where the union of the cells is T .
An Ω-partition may be represented succinctly using the
indexed-family notation C = (Cω)ω∈Ω∪{Abstain}, or in ex-
panded form via
{
CAbstain, Cω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω|
}
.
Colloquially, an Ω-partition of a set of tokens is simply
the separation of the tokens into “piles” (cells) that are
labeled by the outcomes in Ω ∪ {Abstain}. Such parti-
tions arise naturally in the context of voting with tokens.
For example, suppose that everyone who owns at least
one token in a set of tokens, T , is asked to cast a vote
in favor of some outcome in Ω. If we separate the to-
kens into cells according to how the owner of each token
voted, the resulting partition would be an Ω-partition of
T . (Any tokens owned by someone who refused to vote
is put into the pile labelled “Abstain”.)
Next, we develop notation for a simple algorithm that
asks a player to report the outcome of some event. The
player’s response, along with the set of tokens controlled
by the player, are returned.
Definition (Report). The algorithm Report takes as in-
put a tuple (j, E,Ω, T ), where T is a set of tokens, j is
the owner of at least one token in T , E is an event, and
Ω is an outcome space of E. The owner, j, is asked to re-
port which element ω in Ω∪ {Abstain} is True. If j fails
to respond then ω is understood to be Abstain. Report
returns the tuple (ω,R), where R is the set of all tokens
in T that are owned by j.
Next, we define an important algorithm referred to as
the fork. The fork is not an oracle, but will be used as an
important subroutine in the oracles we construct in this
paper. In brief, the fork is the process whereby owners of
tokens stake their tokens on some outcome as a response
to a query.
Definition (Fork). The algorithm F , referred to as the
fork, accepts as input a tuple (E,Ω, T ) – where E is an
event, Ω is an outcome space of E, and T is a finite set of
tokens – and returns an Ω-partition of T .
At a high level, F works as follows. Each owner of
tokens in T is queried to ask which outcome in Ω is True.
The owner’s tokens are assigned to the cell that corre-
sponds to the outcome they reported. If the owner does
not respond (or if their response is not in Ω), then their
token are put in cell CAbstain. Once all tokens in T have
been assigned to a cell, F returns the collection of cells,
which is an Ω-partition of T . In pseudocode:
def F (E,Ω, T ):
// begin with all cells empty
for each ω ∈ Ω ∪ {Abstain}:
Cω ← ∅
endforeach
// query all token owners for reports
for each owner j of tokens in T :
(ω,R)← Report(j, E,Ω, T )
//put the owner 's tokens in the cell
corresponding to the reported outcome
Cω ← Cω ∪R
endforeach
// return the Ω-partition of T
return
{
CAbstain, Cω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω|
}
enddef
For our purposes, all calls to F are assumed to be pub-
lic, as are the resulting outputs. (In practice, F would
be implemented as a smart contract on a blockchain, and
its entire history of calls and responses would be public.)
The for loop in which token owners are queried may be
run in parallel so that all token owners are queried simul-
taneously.
Finally, we define two simple subroutines: Pay and
PluralityWinner.
Definition (Pay). The subroutine Pay accepts as input
a tuple (T, φ), where T is a finite set of tokens and φ is
some amount of currency. Each owner of tokens in T is
given a pro rata share of φ. In particular, if R ⊆ T is the
set of tokens owned by some agent, then that agent will
be paid a total of φ|R||T | .
Definition (PluralityWinner). The subroutine
PluralityWinner accepts as input an Ω-partition
and returns an outcome in Ω whose corresponding cell
in the Ω-partition is of the maximum size. Any ties
are broken uniformly at random. (How ties are broken
is unimportant for our purposes. Our results remain
unchanged so long as the winner is chosen from among
those outcomes whose corresponding cells have the
maximum size.) In pseudocode:
def PluralityWinner({CAbstain, Cω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω|})
//get outcomes in Ω with largest corresponding
cells
X ← {ω | ω ∈ Ω ∧ ∀γ ∈ Ω : |Cω | ≥ |Cγ |}
//break any ties uniformly at random
ωˆ
$←− X
return ωˆ
enddef
Colloquially, PluralityWinner simply interprets an Ω-
partition as the outcome of a plurality vote and returns
the winner. Note that PluralityWinner never returns
Abstain, because X ⊂ Ω and Abstain /∈ Ω.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
We model all agents as being rational. In particular, all
agents come equipped with a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function and always prefer actions that maximize
their expected utility. For simplicity, we model agents as
being risk neutral and having utility functions that are
4quasilinear in money. We assume agents are not budget
constrained.
We further model all agents as being able to engage in
costless communication with one another before making
decisions. For the majority of the paper we will assume
that the set of queriers and the set of reporters are dis-
joint, and we model the players as not being able to make
binding agreements with one another – and so our first
analyses will be done in the non-cooperative setting.
In section XI we consider the effects of costless bind-
ing agreements and transferable utility by analyzing our
approach in the cooperative model. Note that this also
covers the case where the set of queriers and the set of
reporters are not necessarily disjoint.1
Throughout the paper we assume that the center of
each mechanism is a smart contract that has no a pos-
teriori knowledge of the world, and that the platform
on which the smart contracts are executed is censorship
resistant.
IV. THE SIMPLE ORACLE, A0
A. Motivation
We construct a simple decentralized oracle that treats
the fork F as a plurality vote and returns the winning
outcome. The key is to wrap F with a mechanism that
encourages token owners to report True when they are
queried during F . When a certain “economic soundness”
condition is met (see section V B) we can expect the win-
ning outcome of the fork to be the True outcome of the
event. In its most basic form, the algorithm consists of:
• Beginning with a reporting pool of tokens of equal
value
• Paying a reporting fee to the owners of tokens in
the reporting pool before calling F and
• Permanently removing from the reporting pool any
tokens that were not used to report True during the
previous query
Tokens removed from the reporting pool no longer earn
their owners a reporting fee, so they are expected to have
strictly lower value than tokens that remain in the pool.
The price difference serves as an incentive for agents to
report True.
1This is because the utility of a player that is both a querier and
a reporter is the sum of the utilities of their “queirer role” and
their “reporter role”. So for the purposes of this analysis, the
utility of a single “querier-reporter” is indistinguishable from that
of a coalition containing a querier and some positive number of
reporters.
B. Construction
The simple oracle, denoted A0, works as follows. We
create an initial finite set, Tgenesis, of tokens that have
no intended value outside of their use in this context.
This set of tokens serves as the initial reporting pool.
When querying the oracle, the caller pays the oracle a
fee, denoted φ. The oracle distributes this fee to owners
of tokens in the reporting pool.
The oracle passes the query to the fork, which asks
the owners of tokens in the reporting pool to report the
True outcome of the event. The response from the fork
is interpreted as the outcome of a plurality vote, and the
outcome with the most votes is returned by the oracle.
It is those that query the oracle – assisted by smart
contracts – that execute the algorithm A0. In particular,
it is those that query the oracle that determine which
tokens were used to report truthfully during the previous
call, and thus which token owners will be paid during the
next call. While token owners decide the outcome that
the oracle returns, it is those that query the oracle in the
future that determine whether the previous response was
true.
After the oracle returns an outcome, all tokens in the
reporting pool that were not used to tell the truth are
removed from the reporting pool for the next round. In
pseudocode:
// initial state
C0True ← Tgenesis
i← 0
def A0(E,Ω, φ):
// increment query counter
i← i+ 1
// update the reporting pool
//only truth -tellers from previous query remain
in pool
Ti ← Ci−1True
//pay owners of tokens in Ti
Pay(Ti, φ)
//call F with inputs (E,Ω, Ti)
{CiAbstain, Ciω1 , . . . , Ciω|Ω|} ← F (E,Ω, Ti)
// select winning outcome
ωˆi ← PluralityWinner({CiAbstain, Ciω1 , . . . , Ciω|Ω|})
// return winning outcome
return ωˆi
enddef
5V. ANALYSIS OF A0
A. Introduction
Our goal is to design an incentive compatible, indi-
vidually rational mechanism that implements a decision
function that outputs the True outcome for a valid ora-
cle query. We will show that when a certain “economic
soundness condition” is satisfied (see Section V B) the
simple oracle A0 is such a mechanism.
The execution of the oracle A0 is modeled as a repeated
game with two classes of players: reporters and a querier.
Each stage game of the repeated game is associated with
an oracle query, and is modeled as a sequential game that
operates as follows:
1. Each reporter chooses an outcome in response to
the oracle query associated with the current stage
game
2. The querier chooses how to update the reporting
pool
We will show that A0 is incentive compatible by show-
ing that there exists a Pareto efficient, subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in the stage game which results in A0
returning the True outcome for the oracle query. In par-
ticular, we will show that our desired player behavior –
where every reporter always reports the True outcome
and the querier always removes from the reporting pool
all and only those tokens used to lie – is in equilibrium
in the stage game. We will then show that A0 is indi-
vidually rational by demonstrating that the payouts for
all players at this equilibrium are positive and strictly
greater than their minmax payouts.
B. The Economic Soundness Condition
Let Ii,j denote the benefit to reporter j from the oracle
returning a false outcome in response to the ith oracle
query. It is important to note that Ii,j is intended to
capture all benefit to reporter j – including any “extra-
neous” benefit – from the oracle returning a false out-
come in response to the ith oracle query. These benefits
may be paid out in any currency. (We do not assume,
for instance, that these benefits are paid out with to-
kens in T .) For example, if the oracle query is being
used to determine payouts on a prediction market for a
national election, and reporter j has placed a large bet
on the losing candidate, the value Ii,j would include the
value of reporter j’s bet. Similarly, any losing secondary
bets (e.g., derivatives or other side-bets on the outcome,
which may be denominated in entirely different curren-
cies) placed by reporter j are also included in the value
Ii,j .
Let Ii =
∑
j
Ii,j denote the total benefit received by
all reporters from the oracle returning a false outcome
in response to the ith oracle query. This represents the
maximum total collective benefit (over all reporters) that
could be gained from the oracle returning a false outcome
to the ith query.
Let pi denote the market price of a token in the ith
reporting pool Ti, and let p
′
i denote the market price of
a token in Tgenesis \ Ti. (That is, p′i denotes the market
price of a token that has been removed from the reporting
pool for lying.)
Definition (Economic soundness condition). We say the
economic soundness condition is satisfied for the ith or-
acle query if Ii <
1
2 (pi+1 − p′i+1)|Ti|.
When i can be inferred from context, we may omit
the subscripts and simply say that the economic sound-
ness condition is satisfied when I < 12 (p − p′)|T |. If one
assumes that tokens which have been removed from the
reporting pool have zero value (that is, in the case where
∀i, p′i = 0), the economic soundness condition can be ex-
pressed as I < 12p|T |, and can be interpreted as saying
that the total collective benefit of causing the oracle to
lie is less than half of the market cap of the reporting
pool.
The motivation behind this definition is as follows. In
order for the oracle A0 to return a false outcome in re-
sponse to the ith oracle query, at least half of all tokens
in the ith reporting pool – that is, at least 12 |Ti| tokens –
must be used to lie or abstain (otherwise, the True out-
come would necessarily receive the most votes and thus
become the winner). Each token used to lie or abstain
loses pi+1 − p′i+1 in value. Thus the minimum total cost
of causing A0 to return a false outcome in response to the
ith oracle query is given by 12 (pi+1 − p′i+1)|Ti|.
Colloquially, then, the economic soundness condition is
satisfied exactly when the total cost of forcing the oracle
to lie exceeds the total collective benefit – including all
“extraneous” benefit – from doing so. As we will show,
this condition is necessary and sufficient for A0 to be an
incentive compatible and individually rational implemen-
tation of our desired truth-telling decision function.
It is not surprising that our most important results
are predicated on the economic soundness condition be-
ing satisfied. All incentive compatible oracles – even cen-
tralized ones – necessarily have an analogous soundness
condition: if the cost of causing the oracle to lie is less
than one could steal by doing so, it would be irrational
not to cause the oracle to lie. Unsurprising as this may
be, it is important not to take economic soundness for
granted. We are not, in general, guaranteed to have the
economic soundness condition be satisfied, even if the or-
acle has been reporting True outcomes since its genesis.
We investigate the conditions under which we may ex-
pect the economic soundness condition to be satisfied in
practice in section V E.
6Figure 1. The stage game shown in extensive form, as described in the proof of Theorem 1, with the set of reporters modeled
as a single player (r) who may unilaterally decide the outcome of the oracle at the minimum possible cost. The querier (q)
then decides which set of coins to remove from the reporting pool. Observe that, at each move, the querier is indifferent among
her available moves, and therefore it is trivially the case that every response by the querier is a best response and every Nash
equilibrium is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. This game is shown again in normal form in Figure 2.
C. Incentive Compatibility
In this section we show that, when the economic sound-
ness condition is satisfied, the simple oracle A0 is an in-
centive compatible implementation of our desired truth-
telling decision function. In other words, when the eco-
nomic soundness condition is satisfied and all players are
behaving the way we want them to, no player can do
better for themselves by unilaterally deviating from that
behavior. We do this in the standard way, by showing
that the resulting game contains an equilibrium strategy
profile that results in the oracle deciding the True out-
come.
The strategy spaces in the stage game are modeled
as follows. Each stage game is associated with an oracle
query which comes with an event E and an outcome space
Ω. The strategy set for each reporter is {True, False},
modeling the choice reporters make during a fork. The
strategy True represents the reporter choosing to report
the True outcome during the fork, while the strategy
False represents the reporter abstaining or reporting a
false outcome during the fork. Afterwards, the querier
chooses how to update the reporting pool by choosing
from {PunishFalse, PunishTrue}, where PunishFalse
represents the querier removing from the reporting pool
any tokens used to abstain or lie during the fork, and
PunishTrue represents the querier removing from the
reporting pool any tokens used to report the True out-
come during the fork.
Definition (Honest play). Let honest play refer to the
strategy profile in which every reporter always chooses
to report True and the querier always chooses the move
PunishFalse.
The following two theorems establish that honest play
is in equilibrium in the stage game.
Theorem 1. If the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied then always choosing the move PunishFalse is a
best response by the querier to any strategy profile chosen
by the reporters that results in the oracle returning True.
Proof. See appendix.
7Figure 2. The stage game from Figure 1 shown in normal form. The set of reporters (modeled here as a single player as
described in the proof of Theorem 1) is the row player and the querier is the column player. The pure strategy Nash equilibria
– when the economic soundness condition is satisfied – are highlighted in gray.
Theorem 2. If the economic soundness condition
is satisfied and the querier always chooses the move
PunishFalse, then reporting the True outcome is always
the best response by every individual reporter.
Proof. See appendix.
As an immediate result of Theorems 1 and 2 we can
see that honest play is in equilibrium in the stage game.
Moreover, the payouts (in the stage game) to all players
during honest play are strictly greater than their minmax
payouts: the minmax payout is φ− rj |T | for the individ-
ual reporter j, and −φ− I for the querier. So, by Fried-
man’s folk theorem [7], honest play is also in equilibrium
in the repeated game. (In fact, the folk theorems tell
us that honest-play is in equilibrium in the infinitely re-
peated game without discounting, the infinitely repeated
game with discounting, and the finitely repeated game
without discounting. This is nice, as it means our in-
centive compatibility result is robust against our choice
of repeated-game model.) In other words, no individual
player has any incentive to deviate from honest-play, and
so our mechanism is incentive compatible.
Theorem 3. If the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied then A0 is an incentive compatible mechanism that
decides the True outcomes of oracle queries.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Theorems 1
and 2.
D. Individual Rationality
We have shown that when the economic soundness
condition is satisfied, honest-play is in equilibrium for
all players engaging with the oracle. Of course, in the
real world, we cannot force agents to engage with our
mechanism. If they are to engage, they must do so will-
ingly. Since players have the choice of not participating,
we want our mechanism to satisfy an individual ratio-
nality constraint. That is, we want it to be the case
that the outcomes for honest-play are better (or at least
not worse) for all players than they would achieve by
not playing at all. To show that our mechanism is in-
dividually rational, we must show that the equilibrium
at honest-play results in a non-negative payout for all
players.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, let b denote the bene-
fit the querier receives when the oracle returns the True
outcome, and recall that φ denotes the fee paid by the
querier to the reporters.
Theorem 4. If the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied and b > φ then the simple oracle A0 is individually
rational.
Proof. Suppose the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied. Then, since honest play is in equilibrium, it will
suffice to show that the outcomes for each player dur-
ing honest play are non-negative. From Figure 2 we can
observe that honest play results in individual reporters
being paid a pro rata share of φ, which is always non-
negative. Also from Figure 2 we can see that the querier
receives a payout of −φ+ b, which is non-negative when
b > φ. Thus, when the economic soundness condition
is satisfied and b > φ, the payout to all players is non-
negative during honest play.
E. Tenability of Economic Soundness
Since all of the results above depend upon the eco-
nomic soundness condition being satisfied, we will now
examine whether it is reasonable to expect the economic
soundness condition to be satisfied in practice. Naturally,
speculation on the future value of a token can result in
arbitrarily high token prices, so it is certainly always pos-
sible for the economic soundness condition to be satisfied.
However, we are interested in whether the reporting fees
alone can justify a high enough token price for the eco-
nomic soundness condition to be satisfied.
In particular, we want to know whether the report-
ing fee can, simultaneously, be small enough that the
querier is willing to pay it and large enough to make the
market price of tokens (and therefore the market cap of
8the reporting pool) high enough to satisfy the economic
soundness condition. As we will show, this depends very
much on the market’s current appetite for risk, how the
reporting fee is chosen (as a function of I and time), and
how high a fee the queriers are willing to bear.
To aid the discussion, consider a betting platform that
uses an instance of the oracle A0 to report the outcomes
of national elections. At any given time, the total value
of all open bets on the platform is referred to as the
open interest, which is the maximum benefit that the set
of reporters could gain by making the oracle lie: ma-
licious reporters can steal open interest by betting on
low-likelihood outcomes and then forcing the oracle to
resolve to the outcome on which they bet. So, in this
case, I is the open interest.
To consider the simplest case, suppose that the querier
(which, in this case, is the betting platform) always
chooses PunishFalse, and that any tokens used to lie
have zero value (that is, ∀i, p′i = 0). Thus the minimum
cost of causing the oracle to lie is 12p|T | and the economic
soundness condition is satisfied if and only if I < 12p|T |.
Now suppose the betting platform charges the bettors
a fee that is some percentage x of their bet size. Every
bet incurs a fee, and all fees collected by the platform will
be pooled together and used as the reporting fee when it
queries the oracle to decide the outcome of an election.
So φ = xI for every oracle query. For simplicity, assume
that every election results in the same volume of bets,
and so I remains constant over multiple oracle queries.
Finally, let the market’s expected current yield for to-
kens in T be Y . In other words, we expect the market to
behave in such a way that Y = Ap|T | , where A is the sum
of all reporting fees collected over one year. Therefore, if
the betting platform makes n oracle queries in one year,
then A = nxI, and market behavior will result in a token
price of p = nxIY |T | . Using this value for p in the defini-
tion of the economic soundness condition, we can see that
we may expect the economic soundness condition to be
satisfied when x > 2Yn .
As we can see from this simple example alone, the ten-
ability of the economic soundness condition is dependent
on factors outside of the implementer’s control. While
the creators of the betting platform may be able to exert
control over the fees they charge (x) and the number of
times that they query the oracle in a given year (n), they
cannot control the market’s expectation of current yield
(Y ) or whether not their users are willing to pay a high
enough fee (x) to satisfy the condition x > 2Yn .
Example 1: Suppose the market expects a current
yield of 30% for holding tokens in T , and the betting
platform is making one oracle query per month (so that
Y = 0.3 and n = 12). Then if the bettors are unwilling
to pay a fee of 5% on their bets, we should not expect
the economic soundness condition to be satisfied.
Example 2: Suppose the market expects a current
yield of 25% and the betting platform is making one ora-
cle query per week (so that Y = 0.25 and n = 52). Then
if the bettors are willing to pay a fee of 1% on their bets,
we should expect the economic soundness condition to be
satisfied.
In conclusion, we are not guaranteed to have the eco-
nomic soundness condition be satisfied in general. Un-
der some conditions it is satisfied quite easily, and under
other conditions it is not. Moreover, the tenability of the
economic soundness condition depends on some factors
outside of the oracle implementer’s control, such as the
market’s appetite for current yield and user tolerance to
the minimum required fees.
In plain terms, this is not a simple, drop-in “oracle so-
lution” that is certain to work for any project that needs
an oracle. Projects that are considering implementing
the oracles presented in this paper should give special
consideration to how they structure their fees, the mar-
ket’s appetite for current yield, and whether their users
will be tolerant of the minimum required fees.
F. Weaknesses
This mechanism achieves only a weak version incen-
tive compatibility (Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibil-
ity). While honest play is in equilibrium, and while its
resulting equilibrium is Pareto efficient and subgame-
perfect, the strategies played during honest play are not
strictly dominant. Indeed, the game that arises from A0
has no strictly dominant strategies for any of the play-
ers at all. Reporting truthfully is a best response for
individual reporters only if the querier always chooses
PunishFalse. However, always choosing PunishFalse
is only a weakly dominant strategy for the querier.
The truthfulness of A0 hinges upon the querier choos-
ing one particular weakly dominant strategy from among
several available to her. As we have shown above, it is
rational for her to always choose PunishFalse during
each stage game. However, it is also rational for her to
choose one of her other weakly dominant strategies (in
the stage game setting). After all, as shown in Figure
1, the querier is indifferent between her available moves
during the stage game. It is only when the querier consid-
ers the larger repeated game setting that always choosing
PunishFalse becomes more appealing than the alterna-
tives.
Of course, queriers are unlikely to engage with the
mechanism at all unless they intend to engage in honest
play. This is because the mechanism is not individually
rational outside of honest play, and so the querier would
do better for herself by not engaging with the mechanism
at all than to engage and play dishonestly. Nevertheless,
the situation would be greatly improved if the querier’s
preference for honest play were strict.
An ideal mechanism would be dominant strategy in-
centive compatible (DSIC), so that players could choose
to play honestly without having to give any consideration
to the behavior of other players. It is an open question
9whether there exists such a mechanism that can be im-
plemented in a setting where the players have common
knowledge of the truth but the center of the mechanism
(i.e., the smart contract) does not.
A less ambitious goal would be to design a variation
of A0 for which always choosing PunishFalse were a
strictly dominant strategy for the querier in the stage
game, even if there were still no dominant strategy avail-
able for individual reporters. While reporters would still
have to reason about the future behavior of the querier
before deciding whether to report truthfully, the result-
ing stage game would have just one equilibrium: honest
play. This would be a clear improvement upon A0, as
A0 results in multiple equilibria in the stage game – only
one of which results in the oracle returning True. As with
the decentralized DSIC mechanism, it is an open ques-
tion whether there exists a mechanism with this property
than can be implemented in the setting where the cen-
ter of the mechanism (i.e., the smart contract) does not
posses common knowledge of truth.
Finally, this approach necessitates that the economic
soundness condition be satisfied. As we saw in section
V E, this condition is dependent upon things outside of
the oracle implementer’s control. It is impossible, for ex-
ample, for the oracle implementer to prevent third-party
derivatives being resolved by the oracle’s outputs. These
derivative bets can be made without the secondary bet-
tors paying any fee to the reporters. As a result, third-
party derivatives increase the value of I but may not
increase the market cap of reporting tokens, and thereby
jeopardize the incentive compatibility of the oracle. This
is known as the “parasite problem” and we conjecture
that it is unsolvable for all public oracles, both central-
ized and decentralized.
VI. SCALING STRATEGY
Real life execution of the simple oracle A0 requires that
participants agree on the state of the reporting pool T .
The correct state of the reporting pool cannot be veri-
fied by a smart contract alone – in particular, determin-
ing which outcomes were True for each previous oracle
query cannot be done by a smart contract. It requires
a posteriori knowledge of what was common knowledge
during each of the previous calls of F by A0. To ver-
ify the correctness of the current reporting pool, a new
user must examine the output of every previous call of
F by the oracle. For each Ω-partition returned by F , the
new user must decide which set of tokens corresponds to
CTrue. Only then can they determine the correct state
of the current reporting pool. In brief, on-boarding a
new user requires the new user to manually determine
the True outcome for every previous oracle query. This
does not scale.
In the following sections, we define and analyze oracles
that do not need to call F on every oracle query. Instead,
we allow queriers to submit a proposed outcome along
with their oracle query, and we give the reporters an op-
portunity to dispute the proposed outcome if they think
it is false. If the proposed outcome is not disputed, then
the oracle returns the proposed outcome without having
to call the fork. (Our assumption that the smart con-
tract platform is censorship resistant is critical here. An
attacker that can censor dispute transactions can cause
these new oracles to return false outcomes by preventing
reporters from disputing false proposed outcomes.) If the
proposed outcome is disputed, then the oracle uses the
fork to determine which outcome to return, just like A0.
This creates a subgame for each oracle query, where
the querier chooses whether to submit their query with
the True outcome or a false outcome as the proposed out-
come, then reporters decide whether or not to dispute the
proposed outcome. We leverage the credible threat of a
fork along with some bonds to make honest play incen-
tive compatible in the subgame. The result is that, when
the economic soundness condition is satisfied, the oracle
is expected to return the True outcome of a query with-
out having to call F , so the reporting pool does not get
updated after every oracle query. On-boarding new users
does not require them to manually verify the results of ev-
ery previous oracle query, but only those which required
a fork.
VII. AN ORACLE WITH A SINGLE DISPUTE
ROUND, A1
A. Construction
For this new oracle we introduce a dispute round which
leverages bonds and the credible threat of the fork. When
the oracle is queried, the query must be accompanied by
a tentative outcome, ωˆ ∈ Ω, and some initial stake on
that outcome. Then begins a period of time, referred to
as a dispute round, during which token owners have the
opportunity to dispute the tentative outcome in favor of
some other outcome in Ω by adding some specific amount
of stake to their chosen outcome.
If no dispute takes place during the dispute round, then
the oracle returns ωˆ and the initial stake is returned to
its original owner. Otherwise the oracle calls F to de-
termine the winning outcome, just as before. Any stake
– Whether it was the initial stake that came with the
oracle query or stake placed during the dispute round
– that was placed on a losing outcome is transferred to
those who staked on the winning outcome. In this way,
token owners are incentivized to dispute any tentative
outcomes that would not win a fork in favor of outcomes
that would win a fork.
We will show that, at equilibrium, the oracle returns
the True outcome without the reporting pool having to
be updated.
Later in this section we will construct an oracle that
uses a single dispute round and discuss its strengths and
limitations. In the following section, we will define an
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oracle that uses multiple dispute rounds to address those
limitations.
First, we define a few algorithms that will be used as
subroutines in the following oracles.
Definition (DisputeRound). The algorithm
DisputeRound accepts a tuple (E,Ω, ωˆ,D, s), where
E is an event, Ω is an outcomes space of E, ωˆ ∈ Ω
is a tentative outcome, D = (Dω)ω∈Ω∪{Abstain} is an
Ω-partition of the set of tokens that have been staked on
some outcome ω ∈ Ω during the present oracle query, an
s is the amount of dispute stake required to dispute the
tentative outcome. We let d = |Dωˆ|, and we require that
Dωˆ not be empty. That is, we require that the dispute
round begins with some positive amount, d > 0 of stake
on the tentative outcome.
Let T be the set of tokens in the reporting pool. All
owners of tokens in T \⋃D (that is, tokens that are in the
reporting pool but have not already been used to stake
on some outcome during the current oracle query2) have
the opportunity – but not the obligation – to dispute the
tentative outcome in favor of some other outcome in Ω.
A dispute consists of staking s reporting tokens (re-
ferred to as dispute stake in this context) on some out-
come other than the market’s current tentative outcome.
In this paper, for simplicity, we say that disputes require
double the stake on the current tentative outcome. Our
results remain unchanged if disputes are be made to be
α times the stake on the current tentative outcome, so
long as α > 1.
Dispute rounds have a fixed maximum time limit.
If a dispute occurs in favor of outcome ω before the
time limit, then DisputeRound updates Dω to include
the new dispute stake and returns (ω,D, TRUE). Oth-
erwise, DisputeRound does not modify any cell of the
Ω-partition D and returns (ωˆ,D, FALSE).
At most one token holder may actually dispute a ten-
tative outcome during any given dispute round. That is,
while all token holders have the opportunity to dispute a
tentative outcome, at most one token holder can actually
perform the dispute.
Definition (Distribute). The algorithm Distribute ac-
cepts as input a tuple (D, ωˆ) where D is an Ω-partition
(of dispute stake) and ωˆ ∈ Ω ∪ {Abstain}. The algo-
rithm pays out all the tokens in
⋃
D to those reporters
who own tokens in Dωˆ, in proportion to the number of
tokens they own in Dωˆ. That is, if a token holder owns X
tokens in Dωˆ then Distribute will pay that token holder
X
|Dωˆ| |
⋃
D| tokens.
Colloquially, Distribute simply distributes the tokens
in D, pro rata, to the reporters who staked on outcome
2Here we are using the notation
⋃
D to denote the union of sets in
D: ⋃
D =
⋃
X∈D
X = DAbstain ∪Dω1 ∪ . . . ∪Dω|Ω|
.
ωˆ.
Definition (ChoiceByFork). The use of the fork as a
fallback for deciding the winning outcome is expressed in
the subroutine ChoiceByFork, described in pseudocode
here:
def ChoiceByFork(E,Ω, T, D):
//call the fork but let only non -dispute stake
participate
{CAbstain, Cω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω|} ← F (E,Ω, T \
⋃
D)
// select winning outcome (remembering to include
the dispute stake)
ωˆ ← PluralityWinner({CAbstain ∪DAbstain, Cω1 ∪
Dω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω| ∪Dω|Ω|})
// redistribute dispute stake
Distribute(D, ωˆ)
//put all dispute stake in the cell corresponding
to the winning outcome
Cωˆ ←
⋃
D ∪ Cωˆ
// return winning outcome and the Ω-partition
return (ωˆ, {CAbstain, Cω1 , . . . , Cω|Ω|})
enddef
With these definitions in place we are ready to de-
scribe the oracle A1 – the oracle with a single dispute
round. A query to A1 must come along with a tenta-
tive outcome ωˆ ∈ Ω and some initial stake of d > 0
tokens, which we denote {t1, . . . , td}. When the query is
received, all reporters have an opportunity to dispute the
tentative outcome by staking 2d tokens on any outcome
other than the tentative outcome. If no dispute occurs,
the oracle returns the tentative outcome and returns the
initial stake back to the querier. If some reporter does
dispute the tentative outcome, then the oracle calls the
fork to determine the winner.
In the event that the tentative outcome is disputed,
the oracle will use the fork to determine the winning
outcome, just as we did with A0. We require that any
stake that was placed in favor of some outcome during a
dispute round must be used to report the same outcome
during the fork. That is, if a reporter stakes 10 tokens on
outcome ω1 during a dispute round and then the oracle
calls the fork, then that player has no choice but to use
those 10 tokens to report outcome ω1 during the fork. In
other words, if a player has staked on an outcome, then
they remain committed to that outcome in the event that
a fork is called.
In the event that the oracle calls the fork, the oracle
returns whatever outcome wins the fork (just as with A0).
Additionally, the initial stake and the dispute stake are
redistributed to whichever players staked on the outcome
that won the fork. In pseudocode:
// initial state
C0True ← Tgenesis
i← 0
def A1(E,Ω, φ, ωˆ, {t1, . . . , td}):
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// increment query counter
i← i+ 1
// update the reporting pool
//only truth -tellers from previous query remain
in pool
Ti ← Ci−1True
//pay owners of tokens in Ti
Pay(Ti, φ)
//init Ω-partition of dispute stake
for ω ∈ Ω ∪ {Abstain}:
if ω == ωˆ:
Dω ← {t1, . . . , td}
else:
Dω ← ∅
endif
D← {DAbstain, Dω1 , . . . , Dω|Ω|}
endfor
//have a dispute round
(ωˆi, D, DISPUTED)← DisputeRound(E,Ω, ωˆ, D, 2d)
//if there was no dispute
if DISPUTED == FALSE:
//then give the initial stake back to the
querier
Distribute(D, ωˆi)
//no reporting tokens are removed from the
reporting pool
CiTrue ← Ti
// return tentative outcome
return ωˆi
//else if there was a dispute
elseif DISPUTED == TRUE:
// resort to fork
(ωˆi, {CiAbstain, Ciω1 , . . . , Ciω|Ω|})← ChoiceByFork(E,Ω, Ti, D)
// return outcome that won the fork
return ωˆi
endif
enddef
VIII. ANALYSIS OF A1
A. Introduction
We want to show that if the economic soundness condi-
tion is satisfied then, at equilibrium, the oracle A1 returns
the True outcome of an oracle query without having to in-
voke a fork. In section V C we showed that honest play
during a fork is in equilibrium when the economic sound-
ness condition is satisfied. So for the purposes of this sec-
tion it will suffice to show that, if honest play is expected
during a fork, then there exists a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium in the subgame induced by the dispute round
for which:
• The querier submits their query with the True out-
come as the tentative outcome.
• When the tentative outcome is the True outcome,
it is not disputed.
• When a tentative outcome is false, it is disputed in
favor of the True outcome.
We will show that, when honest play is expected dur-
ing forks, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium in the dispute round game that satisfies these three
properties.
B. Unique Equilibrium
The dispute round game is modeled as a sequen-
tial game in which the querier moves first by choosing
whether to submit their query with the True outcome as
the tentative outcome, or some false outcome as the ten-
tative outcome. The querier necessarily stakes d tokens
on this tentative outcome. Then, the reporters choose
whether or not to dispute the tentative outcome. If a
reporter chooses to dispute the tentative outcome, they
must do so by staking 2d tokens in favor of some other
outcome. We are interested in the case where honest play
is expected during a fork, so any play that results in a
fork pays out as if the True outcome were returned.
Theorem 5. When honest play is expected during a fork,
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the
single dispute round game. The unique subgame perfect
equilibrium results in the following behavior:
• The querier submits their query with the True out-
come as the tentative outcome
• If the querier submits the True outcome as the ten-
tative outcome, then no reporter disputes.
• If the querier submits a false outcome as the tenta-
tive outcome, then there exists a reporter who dis-
putes in favor of the True outcome.
Proof. The strategic decisions facing the querier and an
arbitrary reporter during the single dispute round game
are illustrated in Figure 3. Reducing the chance moves
to their expected values results in a simplified game tree
shown in Figure 4, which is solved by backward induc-
tion to see the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (also
shown in Figure 4), which results in our three desired
behaviors.
By Theorem 5, our desired player behavior is incentive
compatible when honest play occurs during a fork. By
Theorem 3, honest play during a fork is incentive compat-
ible when the economic soundness condition is satisfied.
It follows that, when the economic soundness condition is
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Figure 3. The single dispute round game in extensive form. The value d is the amount of stake on the initial tentative outcome.
The value b is the benefit to player 1 if the oracle returns a false outcome. Player 2 is an arbitrary single reporter, and the
effects of the decisions made by the remaining reporters are modeled as chance moves.
satisfied, the oracle A1 is an incentive compatible imple-
mentation of our desired truth-telling function that does
not need to call the fork on every oracle query.
Moreover, one can quickly verify that A1 is individu-
ally rational by observing that the payouts for all players
are non-negative when playing according to the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium shown in Figure 4.
C. Weakness
While A1 does satisfy all of our stated design goals, it
has the unfortunate property that an attacker can grief
honest participants by intentionally causing many forks.
While such behavior would be irrational in the context of
our simple model, it may well be incentivized by extra-
neous circumstances when interacting with A1 in the real
world. (For example, a competing oracle platform may
be financially motivated to damage the scalability prop-
erties of A1 by intentionally causing many forks – perhaps
in the hopes of steering new users to their own platform.)
We address this weakness in the following section.
IX. AN ORACLE WITH MULTIPLE DISPUTE
ROUNDS, A2
A. Motivation
Note that the minimum cost of causing a fork during
a call of A1 is exactly the same as the cost of querying A1
with a false outcome. An attacker who desires to cause
a fork (so as to negatively impact scalability) can simply
query the oracle with a false tentative outcome. This
outcome will be disputed, causing a fork, and costing the
attacker d tokens per query.
If d is small, then it is cheap for honest users to query
the oracle, but it is also cheap for an attacker to cause
many forks. If d is large, then causing many forks is
expensive, but the capital needed to query the oracle in
the first place may be prohibitive for honest users. Oracle
implementers may want to keep the capital required to
query the oracle small, while also increasing the cost of
causing a fork.
There may be many ways to achieve this property.3
3A naive approach is to require that the querier submit their query
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Figure 4. The single dispute round game from Figure 3 with chance moves replaced with expected payouts. The unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium is derived via backward induction and is shown with doubled edges.
Here we will focus on just one: using multiple consecutive
dispute rounds.
B. Construction
For this new oracle we introduce a dispute sequence,
which is simply a finite sequence of dispute rounds. As
before, the query must be accompanied by a tentative
outcome, ωˆ1 ∈ Ω, and some initial stake of d tokens.
Then the dispute sequence begins.
During the first dispute round in the dispute sequence,
token holders have an opportunity to dispute the current
tentative outcome by staking 2d tokens on any outcome
with some small amount d staked on the initial tentative outcome,
but then require, say, 10000d stake in order to dispute the tentative
outcome. While this may technically work in our simple, abstract
model with no consideration of external investment opportunities,
it is unlikely to work in practice. In particular, it is unlikely that
a real-life honest participant would lock up capital to dispute a
false tentative outcome for an ROI of just 0.01%. By contrast, our
proposed approach guarantees disputers of false outcomes (in favor
of True outcomes) an ROI of 40 - 50%. We think this approach is
likely to induce our desired player behavior in practice.
other than the current tentative outcome. If nobody dis-
putes ωˆ1, then the d tokens are returned to the querier,
the dispute sequence ends, and the oracle outputs ωˆ1.
However, if ωˆ1 is disputed, then a new dispute round
begins, with the newly championed outcome, ωˆ2, as the
tentative outcome for the new dispute round. Once
again, all token holders have the opportunity to dispute
the new tentative outcome, ωˆ2, in favor of any other out-
come – but this time they are required to stake 4d tokens
on the newly championed outcome.
This continues either until some tentative outcome sur-
vives a dispute round without being disputed, or until the
dispute stake posted by a disputer reaches some thresh-
old M (a constant chosen by the implementers of the
oracle). If the former occurs, the oracle returns the ten-
tative outcome without calling the fork. If the latter,
then the oracle calls the fork, just as was done for A1.
In general, the nth dispute round has tentative out-
come ωˆn, and token holders can dispute ωˆn in favor of
any other outcome by staking 2n−1d tokens on the newly
championed outcome. If no such dispute occurs then the
dispute sequence ends, the oracle will output ωˆn, and all
token holders who have staked on ωˆn (during any dis-
pute round) will receive their stake back, in addition to
receiving a pro rata share of all stake that was staked on
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outcomes other than ωˆn during any of the dispute rounds.
If a dispute does occur, and the dispute stake was below
the threshold (that is, if 2nd < M), then another dis-
pute round begins. And finally, if a dispute does occur,
and if the dispute stake has met the threshold (that is, if
2nd ≥ M), then the oracle resolves via the fork (just as
with A1), and those who staked on the winning outcome
receive a pro rata share of all the stake that was staked
on losing outcomes. The dispute sequence is formalized
with the following definition.
Definition (DisputeSequence). The algorithm
DisputeSequence accepts as input (E,Ω, ωˆ,D), where
E is an event, Ω is an outcomes space of E, ωˆ ∈ Ω is
a tentative outcome, and D = (Dω)ω∈Ω∪{Abstain} is an
Ω-partition of the set of tokens that have been staked
on some outcome ω ∈ Ω during the present oracle query.
The algorithm runs a sequence of dispute rounds, ter-
minating either when a dispute round completes with-
out the tentative outcome being disputed, or until a
dispute occurs for which the dispute stake is at least
M . The algorithm returns (ω,D, FALSE, FALSE) if no
dispute occurred in any dispute round. It returns
(ω,D, TRUE, FALSE) if at least one dispute occurred, but
no dispute occurred with dispute stake at least M . Fi-
nally, it returns (ω,D, TRUE, TRUE) if there was a dispute
with dispute stake at least M . In pseudocode:
def DisputeSequence(E,Ω, ωˆ1, D):
n← 1
d← |Dωˆ |
EVERDISPUTED← FALSE
while 2n−1d < M
//have a dispute round
(ωˆn+1, D, DISPUTED)← DisputeRound(E,Ω, ωˆn, D, 2nd)
//if there was no dispute
if DISPUTED == FALSE:
return (ωˆn+1, D, EVERDISPUTED, FALSE)
else: // there was a dispute
EVERDISPUTED← TRUE
endif
n← n+ 1
endwhile
return (ωˆn, D, TRUE, TRUE)
enddef
Next we define the algorithm BurnAndDistribute,
which behaves the same as Distribute with the exception
that it burns some of the dispute stake before distribut-
ing the rest, pro rata, to those that disputed in favor of
the chosen outcome.
Definition (BurnAndDistribute). The algorithm
BurnAndDistribute is called in the context of a dispute
sequence. It accepts as input a tuple, (δ,D, ωˆ), where δ
is a positive number (chosen by the oracle designer), D
is an Ω-partition of dispute stake where 0 < δ < |⋃D|,
and ωˆ is an outcome. The algorithm burns (by sending to
a provably unspendable address) δ tokens from
⋃
D and
distributes the remaining tokens to the reporters, pro-
portional to the number of tokens they staked in favor of
ωˆ.
Next, we define a small variation of ChoiceByFork
that burns some amount of tokens before distributing
the rest to token owners. Without such a burn, an at-
tacker with access to a large amount of capital could
cause forks without cost, by iteratively disputing every
tentative outcome until a fork is initiated. (As long as
the final tentative outcome is True the attacker would
recoup – as a reward for staking on True – all the stake
they lost by staking on false outcomes.)
Definition (ChoiceByFork′). The algorithm
ChoiceByFork′ is a variation of ChoiceByFork which
simply calls BurnAndDistribute(|⋃D| − 75 |Dωˆ|,D, ωˆ)
instead of Distribute(D, ωˆ). Its purpose is to guarantee
an ROI of 40% to all token holders who disputed an
outcome in favor of ωˆ. (Note that, while we use a 40%
ROI in this paper, our results hold for any ROI strictly
greater than 0% and strictly less than 50%.)
With these definitions in place, we are ready to
describe A2, which behaves exactly the same as A1
with the exception that A2 uses DisputeSequence,
ChoiceByFork′, and BurnAndDistribute in lieu of
DisputeRound, ChoiceByFork, and Distribute. In
pseudocode:
// initial state
C0True ← Tgenesis
i← 0
def A2(E,Ω, φ, ωˆ, {t1, . . . , td}):
// increment query counter
i← i+ 1
// update the reporting pool
//only truth -tellers from previous query remain
in pool
Ti ← Ci−1True
//pay owners of tokens in Ti
Pay(Ti, φ)
//init Ω-partition of dispute stake
for ω ∈ Ω ∪ {Abstain}:
if ω == ωˆ:
Dω ← {t1, . . . , td}
else:
Dω ← ∅
endif
D← {DAbstain, Dω1 , . . . , Dω|Ω|}
endfor
//run the dispute sequence
(ωˆi, D, EVERDISPUTED, BIGDISPUTE)← DisputeSequence(E,Ω, ωˆ, D)
//if there was a large enough dispute
if BIGDISPUTE == TRUE:
// resort to fork
(ωˆi, {CiAbstain, Ciω1 , . . . , Ciω|Ω|})←
ChoiceByFork′(E,Ω, Ti, D)
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// return outcome that won the fork
return ωˆi
endif
//if there was no dispute
if EVERDISPUTED == FALSE:
// Give the initial stake back to the querier
Distribute(D, ωˆ)
else: // there was a dispute but not with dispute
stake greater than M
//burn some of the dispute stake4 and give the
rest to the winners.
BurnAndDistribute(|⋃ D| − 7
5
|Dωˆi |, D, ωˆi)
endif
//no reporting tokens are removed from the
reporting pool
CiTrue ← Ti
// return tentative outcome
return ωˆi
enddef
X. ANALYSIS OF A2
Observe that the only difference between A1 and A2 is
that the latter runs DisputeSequence, ChoiceByFork′,
and BurnAndDistribute whereas the former runs
DisputeRound, ChoiceByFork, and Distribute. As be-
fore, we want to show that if the economic soundness
condition is satisfied then, at equilibrium, the oracle A2
is expected to return the True outcome of an oracle query
without having to invoking a fork. In particular, we want
to show that, if honest play is expected during a fork,
then there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in
the subgame induced by the dispute sequence for which:
• The querier submits their query with the True out-
come as the tentative outcome.
• When the tentative outcome for any dispute round
is the True outcome, it is not disputed.
• When a tentative outcome for any given dispute
round is false, it is disputed in favor of the True
outcome.
As we will show in the following theorem, when hon-
est play is expected during forks, and when it is com-
mon knowledge that there exists at least one token holder
who does not dispute a true tentative outcome in favor a
false outcome, then there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in the dispute sequence game that satisfies
these three properties.
4Here, we are burning just enough dispute stake so that the ROI for
those who disputed in favor of the True outcome is 40%.
Theorem 6. If honest play is expected during a fork, and
if it is common knowledge among token holders that there
exists at least one token holder who has not disputed in
favor of a false outcome, and if the return for disputing
false outcomes is chosen so that 0 < a < 12 , then there
exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the dispute
sequence game. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium
results in the following behavior:
• The querier submits their query with the True out-
come as the tentative outcome
• If, during any dispute round, the True outcome is
the tentative outcome, then no reporter is expected
to dispute.
• If, during any dispute round, a false outcome is
the tentative outcome, then there exists a reporter
whom we expect to dispute in favor of the True out-
come.
Proof. See appendix.
In addition to being incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational, this oracle can be made expensive to grief
while remaining cheap to query. This is achieved via a
judicious choice of the parameters d, M , and the propor-
tion of tokens burned after each dispute. It is important
to note, however, that as the quantity M − d increases,
so do the number of dispute rounds required to initiate
a fork. Thus the maximum amount of time it can take
for the oracle to respond to a query increases as the gap
between d and M increases. Implementers of this oracle
ought to keep this point in mind when choosing param-
eter values.
XI. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN THE
COOPERATIVE MODEL
Our main results show desirable properties in the non-
cooperative model, but it is important to verify that these
properties hold in the cooperative model, where players
can make binding agreements – after all, what is a smart
contract if not a binding agreement? That is, we must
verify that our results hold when users are able to col-
lude and form coalitions. (This covers the case where the
querier is a reporter, because the utility of a “querier-
reporter” is the sum of the utilities of the querier role
and the reporter role, and so a single “querier-reporter”
is equivalent, with respect to utility, to a coalition con-
sisting of the querier and a separate reporter.) As we
will see, the forking mechanism is trivially secure against
collusion when the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied, and dispute rounds (and dispute sequences) are
secure against collusion if the tokens in T are sufficiently
distributed.
16
Figure 5. The maximum total payout to a coalition that is both able to choose the outcome of an (A0) oracle query and also
includes the querier as a member. If the reporters cause the oracle to lie, their benefit is the querier’s loss, so it is zero-sum:
the benefits and losses to the coalition exactly cancel out.
A. Coalitions in A0
First consider the simple oracle A0 for which all or-
acle outputs are determined via the fork. Recall from
section V that the only strategy that is individually ra-
tional for the querier is to choose PF, PF , and when the
querier chooses this strategy, any coalition of reporters
large enough to unilaterally determine the output of the
oracle has a unique best response: make the oracle re-
turn True. It follows that any coalition that is powerful
enough to determine the outcome of the oracle query but
which does not include the querier as a member does
strictly better by making the oracle return the True out-
come.
Next, consider a coalition that is both powerful enough
to determine the outcome of the oracle and also includes
the querier as a member. Such a coalition is able to uni-
laterally decide among the 8 outcomes in Figure 2, and
the payout to such a coalition is at most the sum of the
payouts for the reporters and the querier for their cho-
sen outcome. The maximum payouts for such a coalition
are shown in Figure 5. Note that the maximum payouts
(assuming b > 0) occur when the oracle returns the True
outcome. Thus, any coalition that is powerful enough to
decide the outcome of the oracle query does best when
the oracle returns the True outcome.
When the economic soundness condition is satisfied,
the analysis is even more straightforward. The economic
soundness condition is satisfied exactly when the mini-
mum cost of making the oracle return a false outcome
is greater than the maximum total collective benefit for
doing so. (Indeed, this is the entire motivation behind
its definition.) If the economic soundness condition is
satisfied, then the cost to any coalition that makes the
oracle lie is greater than the maximum benefit that coali-
tion could receive, and so by the pigeonhole principle the
payout would not be individually rational for at least one
member of the coalition. Therefore, any imputation must
necessarily result in the oracle returning True.
B. Coalitions in A1 and A2
Next, consider oracles A1 and A2. For these oracles,
there are two ways to get a false response to a query:
either via a fork or by having a false tentative outcome
go undisputed during a dispute round. For the reasons
outlined in the previous section, we expect any coali-
tion deciding the outcome of the oracle via a fork to
choose a behavior that results in the oracle returning the
True outcome. So, for this section, we turn our atten-
tion to coalitions that may cause the oracle to return a
false outcome by causing a false tentative outcome to go
undisputed during a dispute round. We will first consider
coalitions in A1, and then show that the strategic situa-
tion for coalitions in A2 can be reduced to those in A1.
We will assume, for this entire section, that the economic
soundness conditions is satisfied.
For A1, recall that during the dispute round (in the
non-cooperative model) every token holder that controls
at least 2d tokens in T has the opportunity to dispute the
tentative outcome. If they dispute the tentative outcome
then they receive a benefit of a2d, and if they do not dis-
pute the outcome they receive nothing.5 In order for the
oracle to return a false outcome to a valid oracle query
without a fork, the querier must submit their query with
a false tentative outcome, and all token holders (either in-
dividuals or mutually disjoint coalitions) must choose not
to dispute the false tentative outcome. In order for such
behavior to be incentive compatible, each token holder
would have to receive at least a2d when choosing not to
dispute the false tentative outcome.
Therefore, any coalition payout that would result in
the oracle A1 returning a false outcome to a valid query
without a fork would necessarily payout out at least a2dn,
where n is the number of players (either individuals or
mutually disjoint coalitions) that control at least 2d to-
kens in T . In other words, the minimum cost of making
A1 return a false outcome without causing a fork is a2dn,
5In A1 the value a is 0.5, while in A2 the value a is 0.4.
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because this is the total cost of bribing all other token
holders to not dispute the false tentative outcome.
As before, let I denote the maximum (gross) benefit
a coalition could receive by having the oracle return a
false outcome to a valid oracle query. Then we can make
the following simple observation relating the distribution
of tokens in T to the incentive compatibility of A1 in
the cooperative game-theoretic model: If Ia2d < n then
there does not exist any imputation for any coalition that
results in the oracle returning a false outcome to a valid
oracle query without calling the fork.
Colloquially, if the tokens in T are sufficiently dis-
tributed, then the cost of paying all necessary token hold-
ers to not exercise their opportunity to dispute the false
tentative outcome is greater than the maximum benefit
of doing so.
Finally, consider the oracle A2. In this oracle there are
several dispute rounds, each of which provides an oppor-
tunity for the oracle to return a false outcome without
resorting to a fork. Analogous to the analysis of A1, the
kth dispute round requires a bond size of 2kd. Every
player with at least 2kd tokens in T would have the op-
portunity to dispute a false tentative outcome during the
kth dispute round. They would stand to gain a2kd for
doing so, and would receive no benefit if they chose not
to dispute. Thus, any individually rational payout for
any coalition that would result in the oracle returning a
false outcome in the kth dispute round (without calling
a fork) would cost the coalition at least a2kdn. Since
such a coalition would receive a (gross) benefit at most I
for making the oracle return false, we make the following
observation: If I
a2kd
< n then there does not exist any
imputation for any coalition that results in the oracle re-
turning a false outcome to a valid oracle query without
calling the fork.6 This is maximized during the first dis-
pute round, when the token distribution requirements for
A2 are identical to those in A1.
In conclusion, the oracles in this paper can be expected
to behave as intended in the cooperative model. For the
oracle A0 we need no further assumptions than those we
made in the non-cooperative model. For oracles A1 and
A2, incentive compatibility in the cooperative model re-
quires that the tokens in the T be sufficiently distributed.
XII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new approach to decentralized
oracle design – one that is not based upon coordina-
tion games. We have presented three specific mecha-
nisms which, under certain reasonable economic condi-
tions, have been shown to be incentive compatible and
individually rational in the non-cooperative model. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that if the tokens in the report-
ing pool are sufficiently distributed, the mechanisms are
also incentive compatible in the cooperative model.
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Appendix A: Calculations
Theorem 1. If the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied then always choosing the move PunishFalse is a
best response by the querier to any strategy profile chosen
by the reporters that results in the oracle returning True.
Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we will model the
set of all reporters as a single player, referred to here as
“the reporter”, attempting to maximize its total payout.
The reporter chooses whether to make the oracle return
the True outcome or some false outcome. (In this way, we
capture the set of all possible strategy profiles of actual
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Figure 6. A decision tree modeling the decision faced by an individual reporter in the stage game when the economic soundness
condition is satisfied and the querier always chooses the move PunishFalse. The effects of the choices of the remaining reporters
are modeled as chance moves. Figure 7 shows a simplified version of this decision tree with the chance moves replaced by their
expected values.
reporters and separate them into those that would cause
the oracle to return the True outcome and those that
Figure 7. A simplified version of the decision tree from Figure
6, with the chance moves replaced by their expected values. If
the economic soundness condition is satisfied and the querier
always chooses the move PunishFalse, then reporting the
True outcome has a strictly better expected value than lying
or abstaining.
would cause the oracle to return some false outcome; this
simplifies our analysis significantly.) We assume that the
reporter gets some benefit I > 0 if the oracle returns a
false outcome, and that this benefit comes at the expense
of the querier. We further assume that the reporter will
minimize their costs wherever possible, so that the cost
of causing the oracle to lie (when the querier chooses to
PunishFalse) is the minimum possible: 12 (p − p′)|T |.
We make a similar conservative assumption for the cost
of causing the oracle to return the True outcome when
the querier chooses to PunishTrue.7 We assume that
7Observe that this assumption is extremely conservative. A coalition
of reporters would have to know the querier’s chosen strategy in
advance in order to guarantee such low costs. For example suppose
the reporter wanted to make the oracle return True while minimiz-
ing their cost of doing so. If the querier where going to choose
PunishTrue, then the reporter would minimize costs by voting
for True with only half of the tokens in the reporting pool. If
the querier where going to choose PunishFalse, then the reporter
would minimize costs by voting for True with all of the tokens in
the reporting pool. Here we are being extremely conservative and
are assuming that the reporter will always be able to minimize their
costs no matter how the querier behaves.
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Figure 8. A decision tree modeling the decision faced by an arbitrary reporter during a final dispute round in a dispute sequence
in the case where the tentative outcome is True. The choice with the highest expected payouts is indicated by doubled lines.
the querier receives some benefit b > 0 if and only if the
oracle returns the True outcome. And finally, we note
that the querier pays an oracle fee φ to the reporter no
matter the final outcome.
Given these payouts, the resulting sequential game is
show in extensive form in Figure 1 and in normal form
in Figure 2.
When the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied, I − 12 (p − p′)|T | < 0, and so (as can
be seen in Figures 1 and 2) the strategy profile
(True, (PunishFalse, PunishFalse)) is a Pareto effi-
cient, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
In other words, when the economic soundness condi-
tion is satisfied, always choosing the move PunishFalse
is a best response by the querier to any strategy profile
of reporters that causes the oracle to return True.
Theorem 2. If the economic soundness condition
is satisfied and the querier always chooses the move
PunishFalse, then reporting the True outcome is always
the best response by every individual reporter.
Proof. Suppose the economic soundness condition is sat-
isfied and that the querier always chooses PunishFalse.
Let j be an arbitrary reporter. We will show that report-
ing True is the best response by j no matter what choices
are made by the remaining reporters.
Let rj denote the proportion of tokens in the reporting
pool T that are owned by j. Recall that each reporter
always receives a pro rata share of the reporting fee φ.
In particular, reporter j always receives rjφ.
Since the querier is always choosing the move
PunishFalse, the reporter j suffers a loss of 12 (p −
p′)rj |T | if they lie or abstain during a fork.
We assume that if the oracle returns a false outcome
then all reporters who lied or abstained will receive a pro
rata share of I (the total benefit of causing the oracle to
lie). We make the conservative assumption that if the
oracle is made to lie, then it was done at the minimum
possible total cost to the set of lying reporters. (This
is conservative because it maximizes the benefit to a ly-
ing reporter in the event that the oracle returns a false
outcome.) That is, if the oracle returns a false outcome,
then just 12 |T | tokens were used to lie or abstain, and
reporter j will receive 2rjI if and only if j reported false
or abstained during the fork.
The decision faced by reporter j is modeled with the
decision tree shown in Figure 6 where the outcome of the
oracle is modeled as a chance move. Replacing the chance
moves with their expected values, we get the simplified
decision tree in Figure 7, from which we can observe that
the payoff to j for reporting True is always rjφ and the
expected payoff for lying or abstaining is q(rjφ − (p −
p′)rj |T |) + (1 − q)(rjφ + 2rjI − (p − p′)rj |T |). We need
only show that the expected payoff for lying or abstaining
is always strictly less than rjφ.
Because the economic soundness condition is satisfied,
the quantities −(p− p′)rj |T | and 2rjI− (p− p′)rj |T | are
both negative. It follows that the quantities rjφ − (p −
p′)rj |T | and rjφ + 2rjI − (p − p′)rj |T | are both strictly
less than rjφ. Thus the expected payoff for lying or ab-
staining is a convex combination of two values that are
both strictly less than rjφ. Hence the expected payout
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Figure 9. A decision tree modeling the decision faced by an arbitrary reporter during a final dispute round in a dispute sequence
in the case where the tentative outcome is false. By assumption, there exists at least one reporter for whom Fm = 0. For such
a reporters, disputing is always the dominant choice, regardless of the value of q. Indeed, since this fact is common knowledge
among all reporters, all reporters know that q = 1. Hence, in this case, disputing the false tentative outcome is the dominant
choice for all reporters, even if they hold large amounts of dispute stake on the false outcome.
for lying or abstaining is strictly less than rjφ.
Therefore, if the economic soundness condition is
satisfied and the querier always chooses the move
PunishFalse, then reporting the True outcome is always
the best response by every individual reporter.
Theorem 6. If honest play is expected during a fork, and
if it is common knowledge among token holders that there
exists at least one token holder who has not disputed in
favor of a false outcome, and if the return for disputing
false outcomes is chosen so that 0 < a < 12 , then there
exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the dispute
sequence game. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium
results in the following behavior:
• The querier submits their query with the True out-
come as the tentative outcome
• If, during any dispute round, the True outcome is
the tentative outcome, then no reporter is expected
to dispute.
• If, during any dispute round, a false outcome is
the tentative outcome, then there exists a reporter
whom we expect to dispute in favor of the True out-
come.
Proof. We will argue by backward induction, beginning
with the final dispute round that would occur before a
fork. We will show that in such a final dispute round,
a True tentative outcome is expected to go undisputed,
while a false tentative outcome is expected to be disputed
in favor of the True outcome. This will form our base
case.
Next, we will assume our induction hypothesis, which
is that all dispute rounds after (and including) the kth
dispute round are expected to have their tentative out-
comes go undisputed if they are the True outcomes, and
be disputed in favor of the True outcomes if they are
false.
Then we will show that the induction hypothesis im-
plies that we can expect the (k − 1)th dispute round to
have its tentative outcome go undisputed if it is the True
outcome, and be disputed in favor of the True outcome
if it is false. The conclusion is that we can always expect
– in every dispute round – that the tentative outcome
will go undisputed if it is the True outcome, and will be
disputed in favor of the True outcome if it is false. An
immediate consequence is that the querier is expected to
submit their query with the True outcome as the initial
tentative outcome.
Base Case: Suppose the final dispute round in a dis-
pute sequence occurs at round m. That is, if the tenta-
tive outcome of round m is disputed, then A2 will call the
fork. There are two cases: either the tentative outcome
at the beginning of the mth dispute round is the True
outcome, or it is the false outcome.
Case 1: The tentative outcome of the mth dispute
round is the True outcome.
The strategic decision facing an arbitrary reporter, j,
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Figure 10. A decision tree modeling the decision faced by an arbitrary reporter during the (k − 1)th dispute round in the case
where the tentative outcome is True and the induction hypothesis is assumed. The choice with the highest expected payouts is
indicated by doubled lines.
during the mth dispute round is shown in Figure 8, with
Tm denoting the total amount of dispute stake reporter j
has placed on True by the beginning of the mth dispute
round, Fm denoting the total amount of dispute stake re-
porter j has placed on the false outcome by the beginning
of the mth dispute round, d denoting the amount of the
querier’s dispute stake, and a denoting the ROI received
by reporters for holding dispute stake on the outcome to
which the oracle ultimately resolves. In our case, where
each successive dispute round requires 2 times the dispute
stake of the previous round and we burn |⋃D| − 75 |Dωˆi |
before distributing rewards, a = 40%. (That is, if a re-
porter stakes X tokens disputing in favor of True, and
the oracle ultimately returns True, then the reporter will
receive their original X tokens back, in addition to 0.4X
more.)
With this notation, disputing the tentative outcome
requires a bond of size 2md. Thus, if reporter j disputes
the True tentative outcome, the oracle will call the fork,
which is expected to return True, which would result in
reporter j receiving a net payout of aTm − Fm − 2md.
Similarly, if the reporter does not dispute the tentative
outcome, but someone else does, then the reporter can
expect to receive a net payout of aTm − Fm. Finally, if
the reporter does not dispute the tentative outcome and
nobody else does either, then the reporter will receive
aTm− Fm.
Thus it is always best for a reporter to not dispute the
tentative outcome of the mth round if it is True – no
matter what other reporters choose to do.
Case 2: The tentative outcome of the mth dispute
round is a false outcome.
The strategic decision facing an arbitrary reporter, j,
during the mth dispute round is shown in Figure 9, using
the same notation as in case 1. In this case, if reporter
j decides to dispute, she can expect a payout of aTm −
Fm + a2
md. Her expected payout if she doesn’t dispute
is q(aTm − Fm) + (1− q)(aFm − Tm) where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
Recall that, by assumption, there exists at least one
token holder for whom Fm = 0. For such a token holder,
the expected payout for disputing is aTm + a2
md, while
the expected payout for not disputing is qaTm − (1 −
q)(Tm). Thus, for this disputer, choosing to dispute is
always a dominant strategy, no matter what other re-
porters do, because for all q where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, aTm+a2md
is greater than qaTm − (1 − q)(Tm). So, we can always
expect the false tentative outcome to be disputed.8
This concludes our base case. We have shown that in
a final dispute round, a True tentative outcome is ex-
pected to go undisputed, while a false tentative outcome
is expected to be disputed in favor of the True outcome.
Induction Step: Now suppose, as our induction hy-
pothesis, that for all k where 2 ≤ k ≤ m, we can expect
that in the kth dispute round a True tentative outcome
will go undisputed, while a false tentative outcome will
8Despite first appearances, we are not resting our fate on the hopes
that just a single reporter will be motivated to dispute a false
tentative outcome. The situation is not so dire. Observe that, since
the existence of this reporter is common knowledge, all reporters
expect that q = 1. Hence, in this case, disputing the false tentative
outcome is also the dominant choice – by quite a large margin – for
all token holders, even if they hold the maximum possible amount
of false dispute stake.
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Figure 11. A decision tree modeling the decision faced by an arbitrary reporter during the (k − 1)th dispute round in the case
where the tentative outcome is false and the induction hypothesis is assumed. The choice with the highest expected payout is
indicated by doubled lines.
be be disputed in favor of the True outcome. We need
to show that we can expect the same behavior in the
(k − 1)th dispute round. As before we have two cases:
either the tentative outcome in the (k−1)th round is the
True outcome, or it is a false outcome.
Case 1: The tentative outcome of the (k− 1)th dispute
round is the True outcome. The strategic decision fac-
ing an arbitrary reporter, j, during the (k− 1)th dispute
round in the case where the tentative outcome is True is
shown in Figure 10. Choosing not to dispute the True
tentative outcome results in the reporter receiving a pay-
out of at least aTk−1 − Fk−1. Choosing to dispute the
True tentative outcome gives the reporter a payout of at
most aTk−1−Fk−1−2k−1d+a2kd. When 0 < a < 12 , it is
the case that −2k−1d+ a2kd < 0, so choosing not to dis-
pute the True outcome is the strictly dominant decision,
no matter what other reporters choose to do.
Case 2: The tentative outcome of (k − 1)th dispute
round is a false outcome. The strategic decision facing
an arbitrary reporter, j, during the (k − 1)th dispute
round in the case where the tentative outcome is false is
shown in Figure 11. Recall that, by assumption, there
exists at least one token holder for whom Fm = 0. For
such a token holder, the expected payout for disputing
the false tentative outcome in favor of the True outcome
is at least aTk−1 +a2k−1d, while the expected payout for
not disputing is at most aTk−1. Thus, for this disputer,
choosing to dispute the false tentative outcome in favor
of the True outcome is always a strictly dominant strat-
egy, no matter what other reporters do. Hence we can
expect that the false tentative outcome will be disputed
in favor of the True outcome.9
This completes the induction step and shows that in
every dispute round of the dispute sequence we can ex-
pect the tentative outcome to be disputed if and only if
it is a false outcome. It follows immediately that we can
expect the querier to submit their query with the True
outcome as the initial tentative outcome.
9As in the base case, we are not resting our fate on the hopes that
just a single reporter will be motivated to dispute a false tentative
outcome. Since the existence of this reporter is common knowledge,
all reporters expect that q = 1.
